Debates on the Iranian Islamic Revolution

Introduction

Dozens of books have been written on the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. These works examine many different aspects of the Revolution and approach it from various angles. However, the fact that the authors belong to different intellectual schools has led them to employ different methods in their analyses. Yet it should also be stated that not all historians write history by consciously following a particular school. They do not all neatly fall into school “A” or “B” and then write history strictly according to that school. Nevertheless, the school of thought into which a historian has read or, at times, into which they were born can lead them to write with certain characteristics. I do not think it is easy to claim that every historian is a deliberate follower of a specific school. In this work, while discussing the debates on the Iranian Islamic Revolution, we will also try to identify and infer the schools of the historians who write on the subject.

In this article, the focus will not be on the events that brought about the Iranian Islamic Revolution, but on how historians have understood these events and from which perspective they have approached them. Still, we wish to briefly mention some facts that should be known when speaking of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The question of from which date one should begin when tracing the roots of the Revolution is itself a separate topic of debate. I, however, think it reasonable to begin the history of the Iranian Islamic Revolution with the “White Revolution” initiated by the Shah in 1962. The truly decisive blow, however, would come from the 1970s onwards.

In 1962, the Shah implemented a set of reform programs known as the “White Revolution.” Khomeini, however, called this the “Black Revolution.” The package of reforms especially included a land reform program. Taflıoğlu states that through this reform the Shah aimed to win the peasants over to his side and thereby break the power of the ulema (Taflıoğlu, 2009, p. 83). After this package of reforms, the parliament was dissolved, and attempts were made to remove Islamic and traditional procedures from parliamentary practice. Certain reforms were introduced, such as abolishing the oath and granting women the right to be elected to office. The ulema strongly opposed these reforms. They stood firmly against them (Taflıoğlu, 2009, p. 83). The reforms did not produce the expected effect, and the ulema resisted them. Subsequently, scholars issued fatwas against the White Revolution. Going even further, they declared that the Nowruz celebrations for that year would not be held because of the Shah’s White Revolution. The Shah then moved into action. Khomeini continued to criticize the Shah. In response, the Feyziyeh madrasas, where Khomeini was also present, were raided. Khomeini and some other dissenting clerics were imprisoned. Afterwards, uprisings broke out in various parts of the country. These uprisings were bloodily suppressed and entered Iranian history as “Bloody Khordad” (Algar, n.d., pp. 358–364).

After a short time in prison, Khomeini was released. Following his release, he continued to speak out against the regime. In 1964, when a decision in favor of Americans was passed in parliament, Khomeini delivered a very harsh speech. Thereupon, Khomeini was exiled from the country. After staying in Turkey for a brief period, he went to Najaf, where he would remain for thirteen years. During his thirteen years in Iraq, Khomeini continued to deliver sermons. Especially from the 1970s onward, he began to explain the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). The theory of velayat-e faqih is quite important in Iranian history and can be regarded as a turning point. Iran is usually described as a country with a 2,500-year monarchical history. With Khomeini and other actors of the period, this concept of monarchy would be overturned.

With his doctrine of velayat-e faqih, Khomeini stepped outside the traditional Shi‘i belief system. Earlier scholars had believed that the right to rule, to govern, and to hold the headship of state belonged to the infallible Imams. The Imams were descended from the Prophet, and they were the ones who ought to rule. However, after the Twelfth Imam, a period of occultation (ghayba) began. From that date onward, the ulema regarded anyone who took the Imam’s place until his return as a usurper. The ulema and pious individuals did not try to govern the state or become its head. But with Khomeini and his theory of velayat-e faqih, a break from this traditional way of thinking emerged. Khomeini argued that until the return of the Hidden Imam, the state should be governed by the ulema (Taflıoğlu, 2009, pp. 29–30). Naturally, Khomeini’s view was not immediately accepted, for it introduced an interpretation that differed significantly from tradition. It is possible to think that the difficulties he experienced during the Pahlavi era contributed to his adopting such an interpretation.

In 1975, the state established the Resurgence Party (Hizb-i Rastakhiz). With this party, the state began to take certain measures. Because of the deteriorating economy, inspections led to fines imposed on approximately 250,000 people. Subsequently, the fined bazaar merchants sought refuge in the ulema (Abrahamian, 2014, pp. 198–199). This group of merchants who took shelter among the ulema must have strengthened the ulema’s power.

During this process, the Shah directly clashed with the people several times. The events that took place in 1978 would make the realization of the Revolution inevitable and eliminate the possibility of reconciliation between the Shah and the populace. In 1978, an article criticizing Khomeini was published in Ettelaat, a newspaper claimed to be semi-official. In this article, heavy accusations were made, such as calling Khomeini a traitor. As a result, the people were inflamed, and uprisings broke out in many parts of Iran. These uprisings would not subside. The army attempted to suppress the rebels bloodily. During and slightly before these events, slogans against the Shah increased significantly among the public. People chanted that the Shah should leave and that Khomeini should come and establish the Iranian Islamic Revolution. At that point, the Shah’s departure from the country had become inevitable. Loyalty to the Shah within the army was rapidly declining. It is said that at this time some individuals were secretly commissioned to prepare a report. The question in the minds of those who prepared the report was whether a pro-Western revolution within the army was possible. The result of the investigation was that a pro-Western revolution was impossible. As a result of these developments, the Shah left the country, and after his departure, Khomeini arrived in Iran on 1 February 1979 (Algar, n.d., pp. 358–364).

After Khomeini’s arrival, there were many groups that had supported the Revolution. These were gradually purged. The Islamic character of the Revolution was preserved. Subsequently, the Iran–United States crisis, which would last 444 days, broke out. The hostages were released after 444 days. The United States carried out an unsuccessful rescue operation. After this, in 1980, a war with no real gains for either side began. Iran and Iraq launched a war in 1980 that would last nine years and end in 1989. In 1989, a peace agreement was signed, and in the same year Khomeini passed away.

Thus, we have briefly recounted the story of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The roots of the Revolution can be sought in different places and narrated in different ways. I personally think it more accurate to date the beginning of the Revolution to 1962. For the reforms the Shah undertook from that date onwards would bring an end to the Pahlavi dynasty. These reforms would shake not only the ulema but also the very foundations upon which the Pahlavi dynasty rested. In my view, the date when the Revolution acquired its Islamic character and when the ulema began to govern the state should be linked to Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e faqih. Before that, no one from among the ulema systematically laid claim to political authority on behalf of the Hidden Imam. Only with Khomeini did a break from traditional Shi‘i thought occur, and the ulema claimed a right to rule. Khomeini played a central role in giving the Revolution its Islamic character. Yet it must be known that other significant figures, such as Ali Shariati, also contributed to the Revolution, and these contributions must be analyzed separately.

Among the prominent historians whose names immediately come to mind when Iran is mentioned is Ervand Abrahamian. I wish to begin with his work. Ervand Abrahamian was born in Tehran in 1940. Of Armenian origin, he continued his educational career in Europe, studying and teaching at leading universities such as Oxford. In terms of historical writing, he adopted Marxist historiography. When addressing the Iranian Islamic Revolution, he sought to explain it primarily by emphasizing the conflict between social classes. He particularly points to the anger of the landowners caused by the Shah’s attempt to implement the White Revolution from 1962 onward. He also focuses in his work on economic dynamics as he interprets the Revolution.

We would like to quote here a passage from Abrahamian that is almost a summary of his views on the Revolution:

“All these changes intensified social tension along three main lines. First, they quadrupled the size of the two classes that had most seriously challenged the Pahlavis in the past—the intelligentsia and the urban working class. Their resentment also increased, because in the intervening period the regime regularly deprived them of organizations such as professional associations, trade unions, independent newspapers, and political parties that might represent them. Second, land reform struck at the ayan who had for centuries controlled the peasants and tribal population. Politically, land reform created large numbers of independent farmers and landless laborers who could easily turn into loose cannon. The aim of the White Revolution was to prevent a Red Revolution; instead, it laid the ground for an Islamic Revolution. Moreover, steady population growth combined with a shortage of arable land produced ever-expanding shantytowns. By the mid-1970s, the magnitude of the social problems confronting the regime had grown to a level unimaginable in the past” (Abrahamian, 2014, p. 183).

As indicated above, Abrahamian emphasizes class conflict as one of the causes of the Revolution. Accordingly, the roots of the Revolution lie in the incompatibility between classes, economic factors, and the Shah’s reform policies. Abrahamian also discusses in his work the impact of land reform.

When examining the Iranian Islamic Revolution, some authors have argued that if certain conditions had been different, the Revolution would not have occurred. They suggest, for instance, that if the Shah had taken harsher measures against the demonstrations, the Revolution would not have taken place, or that if the CIA had increased its influence in the country and begun taking preventive measures earlier, the Revolution would have been impossible. The question of whether the Iranian Islamic Revolution could have been prevented has also been widely debated. At this point, I find Abrahamian’s position persuasive and consider it necessary to present it. In response to such debates, Abrahamian writes: “Such speculation is as meaningless as debating whether the Titanic would still have sunk had the deck chairs been arranged differently” (Abrahamian, 2014, p. 204). He considers debates on the Revolution at this level to be speculative and regards such discussions as empty and futile. I agree with the accuracy of this view and believe that rather than engaging in such debates, one should seek to understand the period itself.

In his work discussing why and how the Revolution occurred, Abrahamian accuses the Shah of failing to understand his own society and the wider world. Standing before us is a Shah who has become alienated from almost every segment of society and has distanced himself from the people, the intelligentsia, and the urban classes. According to Abrahamian, this alienation leads to the Shah’s downfall. He also states that in an age of republicanism the Shah took pride in monarchy and kingship, trying to foreground them. He accuses the Shah of failing to understand the changing world order. Moreover, Abrahamian argues that the Shah made serious mistakes on certain critical issues in the Middle East. For example, his open alignment with the United States on the Palestinian issue and once again siding with the United States on another crucial matter, the Vietnam War, damaged his credibility in the eyes of the people (Abrahamian, 2014, p. 204).

Another key source is Mehmet Serkan Taflıoğlu’s doctoral dissertation, later published as a book, entitled İran İslam İhtilalinde Ayetullah Humeyni ve Velayet-i Fakih Meselesi [Ayatollah Khomeini and the Question of Velayat-e Faqih in the Iranian Islamic Revolution]. As the title suggests, Taflıoğlu concentrates on Ayatollah Khomeini and the theory of velayat-e faqih. In relation to our topic, he discusses debates on the Islamic Revolution between pages 5 and 10 of his work. I have reviewed the debates and authors he presents there. However, among the authors he cites, I preferred to use only those whose works I have actually read in the original. I did not rely on the interpretations of sources I have not directly consulted.

It must be stated that attempting to understand a period solely through the life of a single person brings certain problems with it. When we try to understand history via the biography of a particular historical figure, we must be very cautious, because we might easily gain the impression that this figure is behind everything and that all events are occurring because of him. In Taflıoğlu, we can see that he somewhat places Khomeini at the center of events. Exaggerating Khomeini’s role beyond what it actually was will undoubtedly lead to a misinterpretation of history.

In his work, Taflıoğlu divides Khomeini’s political life into three periods. The first covers the years between 1940 and 1960. In this period, Khomeini did not actively participate in politics; he instead conveyed his views in his writings and through his teaching circles with the public. The second period begins when he becomes a marjaʿ-e taqlid and ends with the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. During this period, he pursued an explicitly anti-Shah political line. He led a very difficult life throughout this process and emerges as a figure whose influence and prestige steadily increased. He criticized the Shah’s policies and was successful in doing so. The third and final period extends from after the Revolution to Khomeini’s death in 1989 (Taflıoğlu, 2009, pp. 29–30). For the purposes of this study, the last period will not be examined.

Taflıoğlu also discusses the leading figures of the period so that the era may be better understood. In his work he mentions key personalities such as Ayatollah Kashani, Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, Ayatollah Sayyid Mahmoud Taleqani, Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, Mehdi Bazargan, and Ali Shariati. He devotes the final section of his book to an extensive treatment of the theory of velayat-e faqih.

Consequently, the following picture emerges: Taflıoğlu first discusses the debates on the Iranian Islamic Revolution in his doctoral dissertation, then goes on to narrate Khomeini’s life and analyze the Revolution through Khomeini. He next examines the lives of other important figures of the period and concludes his work with an analysis of the concept of velayat-e faqih.

Another work I consulted when attempting to understand how authors approached the Iranian Islamic Revolution and to identify their schools of thought is Michael Axworthy’s İran: Aklın İmparatorluğu – Zerdüşt’ten Günümüze İran Tarihi [Iran: Empire of the Mind – A History of Iran]. At the outset, Axworthy states that he will follow a simple, foundational approach, aiming at readers who lack prior knowledge of Iranian history. He wrote the book as if it were a textbook and structured the topics accordingly.

In his work, Axworthy devotes considerable space to Khomeini. Subsequently, one notices that he places particular emphasis on the economy. Between 1963 and 1970, the Iranian economy experienced a boom period. During this time, per capita national income increased by about tenfold. The Shah’s reform program in this period had both advantages and disadvantages. Approximately two million peasants were given land. At the same time, because agriculture was mechanized, some of the workers could no longer find employment on the land. This led to migration to major cities. There were investments in education and health. The number of students attending school rose dramatically. After 1977, an economic crisis emerged in the country. Especially the measures taken in response to increasing inflation produced negative results (Axworthy, 2016, pp. 306–308).

Axworthy also raises an issue that is not often mentioned in other works. In his view, another development that contributed to the increase of social unrest was the presence of approximately 50,000 Americans in Iran in 1979. These Americans, who lived in the country with special privileges, came to be hated by the people. Axworthy also notes that people opposed some of the Shah’s actions that they considered wasteful and irreligious. While the Shah dreamed of restoring the glory of ancient empires and organized a massive ceremony at Persepolis in 1971, emphasizing the pre-Islamic monarchical tradition of Iran, these things appeared foreign and repellent to the people (Axworthy, 2016, pp. 309–312).

Axworthy ultimately evaluates the Shah’s rule as follows:

“The Shah’s rule is a mixture of successes and failures; neither clearly dominates the other. Some of the much-praised economic and developmental policies are quite impressive, but others are shallow and superficial. His major failures are fundamentally political. The Shah has no program to re-establish representative government, and his only solution to the prevailing atmosphere of turmoil is repression. If he had been able to secure the support of the people, he might have remained in power much longer. However, the monarchy was distant from the attitudes, concerns, and lives of ordinary Iranians. Paradoxically (perhaps partly because he had long been struggling against a Marxist underground movement), the Shah adopted a mistaken Marxist analysis: he believed that if he ensured material prosperity through successful development policies, everything else would automatically improve. Yet very few economies can sustain continuous economic growth” (Axworthy, 2016, pp. 313–314).

The author then turns to the policies of Jimmy Carter. In line with Carter’s human rights–oriented policy, Iran took certain positive steps in the field of human rights. These positive steps encouraged the opposition and enabled opposition voices to be heard in Iran. Axworthy does not neglect to mention Ali Shariati, an important figure of this period. Shariati was particularly influential among the educated classes (Axworthy, 2016, pp. 314–316).

In sum, if we are to evaluate Axworthy’s approach: he emphasizes factors such as the Shah’s repressive policies, flawed economic strategies, the alienation of many segments of society, Khomeini’s leadership role, and the mobilization of clerical power against the Shah as the main reasons that ultimately forced the Shah to abandon the throne (Axworthy, 2016, pp. 306–316).

In connection with the topic, I also read a Persian work: Tārīkh-i Tehevvulāt-i Sīyāsī-i Īrān by Dr. Musa Necefi and Dr. Musa Fakih Hakkani. This book covers Iranian history from ancient times, discussing key events up until the end of the Pahlavi regime and the establishment of the Iranian Islamic state (Necefi & Hakkani, 1392).

When narrating the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Khomeini again appears as a key figure. After Khomeini began to actively oppose the Shah, he spoke out against three main issues and opposed three particular developments. The first was the provincial and district councils law; the second was the Shah’s White Revolution; and the third was the capitulations (Necefi & Hakkani, 1392, p. 564). Through these positions, Khomeini gradually attracted the people around him and increased his influence.

On the provincial councils, Khomeini especially feared that Bahā’īs would gain entry into state institutions. When he issued a declaration against the Shah on this issue, the Shah retreated, and the decree regarding provinces and districts was rescinded. We have already discussed above the Shah’s White Revolution, Khomeini’s labeling of it as a Black Revolution, and his struggle against it. As for the capitulations, they were passed through the efforts of Hasan Ali Mansur and caused great controversy. Khomeini criticized these capitulations, which were in favor of the United States. After he delivered a major speech on this issue, he was exiled to Turkey (Necefi & Hakkani, 1392, pp. 567–568). Later, an assassination attempt was carried out against Hasan Ali Mansur, and he was killed (Necefi & Hakkani, 1392, p. 570).

The same work then sets out, in article form, the reasons for the collapse of the Pahlavi regime. These points simultaneously constitute the factors that enabled the establishment of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The reasons for the deterioration of the Pahlavi regime are listed as follows:

-The deterioration of the economy and flawed financial policies

-Actions taken against Islamic values and moral decay

-Weakness displayed in governing the people

-The increase of fear and violence in society

-The growing influence of foreigners in government

-The establishment of the Resurgence Party

-The emergence of a new global order and the United States’ imposition of democracy

-The publication of a letter against Khomeini

-The state’s weakness in suppressing uprisings
(Necefi & Hakkani, 1392, pp. 572–580)

After listing these points, the authors briefly explain each and examine the causes that brought about the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The above items are presented as the main reasons that led to the Revolution.

Another work consulted in researching the Islamic Revolution is Bülent Keneş’s İran Siyasetinin İç Yüzü [The Inside Story of Iranian Politics]. Keneş asserts that in order to understand the Revolution in a “comprehensive” and “theoretical” manner, one must carefully analyze the history of political thought beginning from a very early period—about 150 years prior. He particularly foregrounds the role of the ulema, emphasizing them as organized actors who had won the trust of the people (Keneş, 2013, p. 42).

Keneş traces the assumption of a dominant role by the ulema back to the Qajar period and especially to their participation in the constitutional movement of 1906. The Shah’s policies had alienated the ulema and merchants from the government, and the ulema had become a refuge for those who opposed the Shah. Thus, the roots of the alliance between merchants and the ulema must be sought in the past, and this alliance is indeed visible in the Revolution. Keneş underscores another important concept here: marjaʿ-i taqlid. This concept signifies the most learned and knowledgeable scholar within the ulema who is to be followed in matters of religious practice and to whom zakāt and other financial contributions are paid. This also means that whoever holds the position of marjaʿ-i taqlid reaches a position of both material and spiritual power and influence. After Borujerdi, Khomeini himself would assume this position in 1961 (Keneş, 2013, pp. 44–46). If the marjaʿ-i taqlid works against the state or government, then, as the example of Khomeini demonstrates, he can become a major threat. Knowing this, the Shah tried to take measures. He sent a telegram to Ayatollah Shaykh Muhsin al-Hakim, an Arab mujtahid residing in Najaf, encouraging him to assume the position of marjaʿ-i taqlid. In this way, the influence of the city of Qom would be reduced (Keneş, 2013, p. 47). However, instead of this wish being fulfilled, Khomeini would take over this position.

In his work, Keneş also discusses the reasons that brought Khomeini to the fore. In Khomeini’s time there were three persons who could have become marjaʿ-level authorities, and apart from these there was also a figure supported by the Shah. After he died, the Shah again tried to ensure that someone of his choosing would succeed him. Although Shariatmadari displayed some closeness to the Shah, the people rose against him, because it was a time when ulema who entered into cooperation with the state were criticized and looked upon unfavorably. Keneş divides the stance of the ulema into three categories. The first group consisted of those who were in harmony with the state; these were disparagingly labeled “palace ulema” or “the Sultan’s ulema.” A second group refrained from open opposition to the state and opted for silence. The third and final group consisted of those who, together with Khomeini, openly and harshly opposed the Shah (Keneş, 2013, pp. 49–50).

Keneş also stresses Shariati’s impact in his work. He presents Shariati as someone who made Muslims revolutionary. According to Shariati, Muslims must work to establish justice and must move against oppression and oppressors. In his view, the class that should guide society was not the ulema but the intellectuals (Keneş, 2013, pp. 50–51). This may be one of the fundamental differences between him and Khomeini. The views Shariati advanced had a powerful effect on the intelligentsia. Keneş also highlights figures who influenced Khomeini. Among them, he devotes particular attention to Shariati and Jalal Ali (Jalal Al-e Ahmad). After Jalal Al-e Ahmad wrote his work Gharbzadegi (often translated as “Westoxication” or “Occidentosis”), many people distanced themselves from blind Western imitation and were influenced by his ideas. By doing so, Keneş also points to the individuals who “made Khomeini who he was” (Keneş, 2013, pp. 53–54).

Keneş traces the growing influence of the Shi‘i ulema to the 19th century, when the Qajar dynasty was weakened and the country came under foreign occupation. From that period onward, the scholars emerged as the only force that opposed foreigners and resisted oppression, and they began to gain prominence. He also states that Khomeini’s success lay in his secrecy (ketumiyet). In other words, in order to be able to draw other groups to his side and to make his opposition to the Shah more powerful, he did not share his long-term plans for the future with other people.

Keneş evaluates the main reason for the success of the Revolution as follows:

“Numerous analyses have been made regarding the conditions that enabled the Revolution to succeed in Iran and led to the overthrow of the Shah. However, the main reason is that after the great increase in oil revenues, in order to carry out a policy of modernization, the Shah created a broad class that received Western-type education and expected this class to share, to a large extent, the material culture of the West. The success and prosperity of this class caused deep dissatisfaction among those segments of society that received no share—or only very little—from the newly emerging wealth. Around the cities, large shantytown settlements of unemployed and increasingly impoverished people began to form” (Keneş, 2013, p. 63).

As can be seen from the above, Keneş stresses that the main cause behind the Revolution was economic deterioration and the injustice in the distribution of wealth. He also underscores that Shi‘ism itself played an important role in the realization of the Revolution (Keneş, 2013, p. 72).

To summarize, in İran Siyasetinin İç Yüzü Keneş attempts to address the Revolution from many angles. In this respect, one might say that he follows something akin to the Annales school: he seeks to understand social change and development from the past to the present, does not write history solely through great individuals, pays attention to social phenomena, and tries to benefit from various disciplines.

Another work I wish to mention is William L. Cleveland’s Modern Ortadoğu Tarihi [A History of the Modern Middle East]. Cleveland begins his discussion of the Iranian Islamic Revolution by examining its impact on the Middle East. He states that after the Revolution, Muslim countries in the region—whether led by secular or dictatorial rulers—were deeply alarmed, and Iran was isolated. He also emphasizes that U.S. policies in the region were undermined (Cleveland, 2008, pp. 467–468).

In his book, Cleveland also deals with a figure that is not much mentioned in other works: Mehdi Bazargan. Bazargan later founded the Freedom Movement, which also included an important ideologue like Shariati. Established in 1961, this movement opposed the Shah and became the leading force of liberal opposition. Cleveland further notes that certain deep-rooted sentiments persisted in society and that Khomeini made use of them. As examples, he cites the 1891 Tobacco Protest, the 1905–1911 Constitutional Revolution, and the struggle against the White Revolution in 1963 (Cleveland, 2008, pp. 470–472).

In the remainder of his section on the Iranian Islamic Revolution, Cleveland addresses many of the events that have already been mentioned above, such as Bloody Khordad, the article published in Ettelaat, and the changing attitude of the United States toward the Shah. He thus concludes his discussion of the Revolution.

Conclusion

It is often said that the Iranian Islamic Revolution brought an end to a 2,500-year monarchical tradition in Iran. As noted, with this Revolution a monarchy believed to be 2,500 years old was abolished and an Islamic state was established. Because of both this and the emergence of a new system, many authors, historians, and scholars have taken an interest in this process and produced works on it. Some have traced the Revolution back 100 years. For others, Khomeini played the central role. Some have approached the events through a Marxist understanding of history. Others have evaluated the Iranian Islamic Revolution in the context of the influence of great powers. In this article, due to page limitations and heavy workload, I have confined myself to a limited number of works that can be considered fundamental. Although the number of works examined is limited, I have tried to discern what kind of historians the authors are and to which schools they may belong. This was the most challenging part of writing this piece. While we can, in some cases, state that certain historians write from a Marxist perspective, we could not, in every case, determine from which school and with what purpose they approached the Iranian Islamic Revolution in the way they did. Despite all this, I have attempted to point out which aspects they foreground and which they consider more significant when addressing the Revolution.

References (APA 7)

Abrahamian, E. (2014). Modern İran tarihi (D. Şendil, Trans.). İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Algar, H. (n.d.). Humeyni. In Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi (Vol. 18, pp. 358–364). İstanbul: TDV Yayınları.

Axworthy, M. (2016). İran: Aklın imparatorluğu (Ö. Gitmez, Trans.). İstanbul: Say Yayınları.

Cleveland, W. L. (2008). Modern Ortadoğu tarihi (M. Harmancı, Trans.). İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı.

Keneş, B. (2013). İran siyasetinin iç yüzü. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.

Necefi, M., & Hakkani, M. F. (1392). Tarih-i tehevvülat-ı siyasi-i İran. Tahran: Müessese-i Mütalaat-ı Tarih-i Muasır-ı İran.

Taflıoğlu, M. S. (2009). İran İslam İhtilalinde Ayetullah Humeyni ve velayet-i fakih meselesi (Doctoral dissertation). Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Ankara.

Translated by ia

Ozan Dur

Türkiye based Middle East Researcher